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Triple play as a separate market? 




Double  and  triple  play  bundled  offers  are  common  phenomena  in  many  national 
communication markets. However the overall market context, technological background of 
provision, the level of facility based platform competition and strategic role of the bundled 
offers  seems  to  be  different  in  national  markets.  There  is  clear  challenge  to  the  current 
European regulatory approach to broadband markets, which is treated as a separate market on 
its own. If there was a separate market for the bundled product, the whole market analysis and 
remedy system had to be adapted to this market reality. Testing the (triple play) bundle the 
market hypothesis is the logical and necessary first step to address this issue.   
We  designed  and  conducted  an  empirical  study  supported  by the  Hungarian  Competition 
Authority  in  order  to  address  these  questions.  A  special,  situation  adaptive  questionnaire 
design was applied in order to get the possibly best informed and adequate stated preference 
reactions to a 10% price change. We used the critical loss test for market definition, testing 
whether there is a separate market for triple play bundles.  
Results  indicates  that  the  market  definition  question  whether  bundle  has  to  or  could  be 
considered  as  a  separate  relevant  market  can  be  answered  using  well  designed  survey 
techniques. Many clues support the hypothesis that the triple play bundle in 2010 indeed was 
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Increasing take-up of multiplay bundles throughout Europe is a striking development on the 
communications market, and one of the most exciting and challenging issue from strategic, 
marketing  or  regulatory  point  of  view.  However  multiplay  is  a  concept  without  strict 
definition, therefore is not a well identifiable object for scientific study. It is an umbrella 
concept,  meaning  different  types  of  service  bundles  combining  two  or  more  different 
electronic  communication  services. In  case  of  triple  play,  the  standard  usage of  the  term 
normally refers to a bundled telephony, television and internet package, but still is a notion 
which is not differentiated according to the exact parameters of these services. On the market 
a wide range of combination of options exist by the different characteristics of composing 
services: subscription and call prices for the telephony; number and composition of channels 
for  television,  speed  characteristics  of  the  broadband  part  of  the  bundle,  etc.  For  the 
convenience of the study  if we use the term n-play, it also  just refers the number of the 
services comprising the bundle, and if we consider the exact designation of the services we 
use the xy 2-play expression  for example. In this study 3-play always refers exactly to a 
bundle of telephony, TV and  broadband internet, but without taking care of the technology 
behind, or whether it is provided technically on the same communication media or not
1.  
 
According to the market realities usually there is the option of buying the services separately, 
from different providers or in many cases from the same provider even though that is not the 
most popular option. That means that from commercial point of view mixed bundling is the 
normal characteristic of the market. However there are incentives
2 to provide as well as to buy 
bundled services. 
On the supply side there is an incentive to exploit the gains from economies of scope. There 
are  no  strong  complementarities  in  the  production  of  the  individual  services  of  a  typical 
multiplay bundle. Economies of scope may be present though presumably not strongly in the 
production of the bundled services. But the gains from joint marketing, billing and customer 
care can be significant. It is more economic to sell more services to the same customer, and 
binding her than acquire a new one. It is the case with selling “new services” by established 
providers of a popular service like cable TV. It is an additional service and additional sale to 
sell broadband and telephony to their customers.  
Beside these cost efficiencies, there are obvious strategic reasons of bundling. The bundle 
offer can be attractive if it is the first on the market, so newcomers use this for attracting more 
subscribers and gaining scale faster. Because customer loyalty is very important, and having a 
bundle makes switching more painful and difficult (i.e. switching cost is higher) even if there 
is mixed bundling, incumbent telecom companies introduce bundles in order to delay quick 
erosion of their fixed telephony subscriber base. Of course it is a necessary step in order to 
take up the gauntlet thrown in by the challengers.  
 
Bundle can be attractive for many consumers too. If part of the savings resulting from lower 
cost of providing services in bundle passed to the customers, many of them will prefer to buy 
the services in the form of a bundle. One-stop-shopping has some transaction cost advantages 
too.  Nevertheless  committing  to  a  bundle  may  increase  the  cost  of  switching.  Though 
according to the current market practices, there is no need for entering into too long (more 
than 2 years) commitment by the customers to get the discounts. If the market has not reached 
a mature stage yet and there is competition in the retail market (i.e. more than one player is 
capable of providing bundled services) the lock-in effect via bundling is not too strong. If 
                                                 
1 In a 3-play package can be provided via xDSL, coaxial cable, fiber, wireless. Referring to a bundle as 3-play 
package it is indifferent whether the TV is analog, DVB-C, DVB-S or IPTV for example. 
2 See Pernet (2006) and Crampes and Hollander (2006) for analyzing the different efficiency and competitive 
strategic incentives for bundling.   3 
there are only few who are switching, positive brand loyalty or customers’ inertia, may be a 
more  plausible  explanation  of  that  behavior  than  lock-in.  In  case  of  competitive  bundle 
markets  the  players  compete  with  a  range  of  bundle  offers,  where  each  bundle  is  a 
combination of the same elements with different technical, quantity or quality terms and price. 
Each competitor sells a basic package and there are above some bigger, faster, better offers 
usually with quantity discounts, and at the top of the list there might be a premium package as 
well. Therefore a customer who is loyal to the brand can switch to another package in house 
from the menu, and do not have to switch to another provider if she wants to change the 
price/quantity/quality  terms.  It  is  now  the  everyday  characteristic  of  the  electronic 
communication market and very significant in countries where cable is the main competitor 
beside telecom incumbents. 
 
Multiplay in the EU 
 
Though there are some publicly available data on multiplay penetration from almost all EU 
member states in the 14
th and 15
th Reports
3, the data collection methodology is not transparent 
and country reporting is rather ambiguous. Even triple play was interpreted differently by data 
providing authorities
4. Therefore the data in the figures we found in the reports do not seem to 
be comparable, so we have to consider them only as indicative of the market situation.  
The next figures show the market situation in 2008 and 2009, with each and every caveats 
described in the notes you find in the Reports
5. For better comparability we calculated the 
household penetration of the services as a substitute for number of bundle subscriptions by 
100 inhabitants. 
 
Figure1. Household penetration of multi-play services in the EU, 2008 












* See notes in the original reports 
Household penetration is calculated using 14
th Report data,  
 
                                                 
3 See the 14
th and 15
th Report. 
4 Notes attached to the figures say almost everybody interpreted the meaning of bundle offers on its own way. 
For example Luxembourg interpreted triple play as fixed telephony + broadband + mobile, there are missing data 
of some or all multiplay bundles, etc. 
5 14
th and 15
th Report.    4 
Figure2. Household penetration of multi-play services in the EU, 2009 












* See notes in the original reports 
Household penetration is calculated using 15
th Report data,  
 
In spite of the obvious data  incoherence problems, some general  conclusions about some 
tendencies may be drawn. The comparison of the 14
th and 15
th report data shows that the 
growing  market  significance  and  increasing  penetration  of  the  multiplay  bundles  is 
straightforward. The average growth of multiplay from 2008 to 2009 in countries reported is 
more than 50%.  
A quick correlation analysis shows that by using the data from the EU 15
th Report, multiplay 
penetration normally tend to be higher in countries with higher GDP per capita and higher 
broadband penetration. The first correlation is strong and the latter is no news in itself, but 
behind that there is also the positive correlation between broadband penetration and the triple 
play penetration, but not with double play.  
Comparing the penetration of double and triple element packages the rate of triple play is 
somewhat higher in countries with significant cable broadband but this is far from being a 
universal phenomena. The country experience is very mixed and it is hard to find any patterns 
which may be a good proxy to guess.  
Based on the available data we did not find any strong connection between penetration of 
broadband,  fix  telephony,  the  dominant  means  of  TV  delivery  and  multiplay  package 
penetration. After this bird’s eye view of Europe we turn to the market specialties of Hungary.  
 
 
Multiplay in Hungary 
 
Though the 15
th Report does not contain data on Hungary, there is some information available 
from the surveys commissioned by National Communication Authority of Hungary in 2008 
and 2009. These public data are sufficient to show the basic characteristics of the market for 
multiplay services.  
   5 
Figure3. Household penetration of subscriptions to service combinations  
Household penetration of subscriptions to combination of services in 














































Source: NHH Working Plan 2010 
 
The published data from yearly large sample surveys show only the service combinations of 
subscriptions.  In  order to read  it  properly  we  have  to  know that  a  combination  does  not 
necessarily mean that it is a bundle. The services can be combinations of single services, even 
from different providers, but might also be a bundle. Consuming more than two services is 
increasing, but penetration of some combinations like single telephone and single TV service 
and the combination of these are significantly decreasing, mostly because of the declining 
popularity of fixed telephony, and partly because of increase of buying three services. Internet 
service is on the rise in single and every other combination as well. 
 
We have partial information about real bundles, because public data about the composition of 
the population of those who subscribed to at least two services is not available, though we 
know the composition of the group who subscribed telephone, internet and pay television 
services. As the figure shows 68% of them consuming at least 2 services in bundle, and only 
28% who is a real triple play customer. This means in 2009 there were about 7% of the 
households who really subscribed to triple play.   6 
Figure4. Share of the bundled and only combined consumption of the three services together  
Share of subscribers to bundled services among those who  
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Source: NHH Working Plan 2010 
 
Te regulatory problem 
 
In spite of the noise, available data clearly shows that subscribing to more than two services is 
becoming common today, and consuming them in service bundles is on the rise, however still 
far from dominant in Hungary. Mixed bundling is an everyday phenomena, and its presence 
makes  the  analysis  of  service  markets  more  complicating especially  in  cases  when  some 
regulatory  surveillance  may  be  appropriate  or  what  is  more,  required.  Telephony  and 
broadband  access  is  regulated  nationally  but  strictly  according  to  the  European  telecom 
regulatory framework, and periodic regulatory review of some markets is required. Though 
the European approach is focusing on the regulation of upstream, the periodic market analysis 
starts with the retail markets. Without bundles and complementarities, the market analysis 
would be easier. With bundles widely present, the analysis of individual service markets, as if 
they were really unconnected, may result in wrong definition of the market and therefore 
misguided analysis after. Even if the individual service market hypothesis might be the right 
one, existence of bundles makes the application and interpretation of the SSNIP test more 
difficult, because there may be only a single bundle price, therefore there might be a need for 
using  imputed prices  for bundle elements.  And  even  in this case  it  is worth to note that 
costumers’ switching decisions may rightly be influenced by the presence of bundle. Theory 
does not tell us, how: 
 
The  regulator  always  has  to  cope  with  the  methodological  challenge  of  identifying  the 
relevant market in a way that diminishes the error of defining too wide or to narrow the 
markets in the product dimension. Too wide market definition may lead to missing the target 
of identification the market power, which is real on the market. The other side, defining the 
market boundaries too narrowly, leads to the problem of overregulation. The strong presence 
of bundles provokes the question whether the bundle is a separate relevant market, or part of 
the larger relevant market where single services compete with bundles. In case there is no 
separate bundle market there would be need to take care on bundles only technically in the 
market definition phase. However bundles may cause problems on the market if they can   7 
serve  to  distort  competition  via  leverage  by  a  player  who  has  unmatchable  advantage  in 
providing bundles which hardly replicated by its rivals. In such a case initial competition 
problem may evolve to a separation of the market by detaching the segment penetrated by 
bundles from the original set of close substitute services. If only one firm were able to provide 
bundles, this practically resulted in the monopolization of that market. It is trivially a problem 
however we do not have to think so much afar. It is enough to understand that the question, 
whether any set of the different bundles constitute a separate market is a relevant question for 
regulators to ask if they really want to understand the situation on the market, and if problems 
arise, address them.  
 
The  market  definition  issue  is  more  exciting  if  the  answer  is  not  trivial.  New  market 
developments may change the landscape but it is better to keep the pace with the market than 
simply react when it becomes overdue.  
The standard SSNIP process starts with an initial product and tests whether the hypothetical 
monopoly provider of that product lost profits after a small but significant (5% or 10%) non 
transitory price increase above the competitive price. If he would loose (i.e. the test fails), that 
shows that there are substitutes to the product, so it cannot be a separate relevant market. 
Then the set has to be expanded by incorporating the closest substitute, and the test must be 
repeated, until it will not fail. Then we have reached the smallest set of products which belong 
to the same market. This process of finding demand substitutes is easy to understand, but 
needs more care to manage, because of the mere fact that it is path dependent. That means the 
market we identify as the relevant market depends on where we had started. It is not a big 
issue if we have clear preference what market we want to test, and consequently from where 
to start the process. Traditionally regulated markets can be good starting points. Under the 
European regulatory framework, it is on the national regulators’ normal agenda to investigate 
some prescribed markets regularly, and beside that to start an investigation if they surmise 
that there is some real competition problem on any other markets. In a specific case they 
should now where to start the investigation, and how to perform the test. 
 
 
Aim of the research 
 
In our case the question is whether the retail broadband internet as a whole is the relevant 
market or single offers and bundles constitute separate markets. The research task stems from 
this question is to construct and test a research methodology which is capable of giving an 
answer  at  least  some  indicative  one,  helping  the  regulators  in  handling  potential  or  real 
problems on the broadband market.  
 
A careful analysis starts with the identification of the choice options from the single service to 
the more complicated bundles.     8 
Figure5. Possible consumption combinations of telephony, internet and television services 
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If  we  use  the  notation  a  little  bit  differently  than  the  traditional  use  of  Venn  diagrams, 
“internet” set in the figure is restricted to single an internet offer which is disjunctive set from 
the  other  different  bundles.  Consequently  the  two  2-play  sets  containing  the  internet  are 
disjunctive  to  the  3-play.  The  product  market  definition  question  starts  from  the  single 
internet point of view is that the product market is a single broadband internet service or a 
union of some of these disjunctive sets or all of them
6. From this start the relevant market 
options are the following: 
 
1.  single {i},  
2.  or {i} & {i+t},  
3.  or {i} & {i+tv},  
4.  or {i} & {i+t+tv},  
5.  or {i} & {i+t} & {i+tv}  
6.  or {i} & {i+t} & {i+t+tv} 
7.  or {i} & {i+tv} & {i+t+tv} 
8.  or {i} & {i+t} & {i+tv} & {i+t+tv} 
 
At first sight this task seems to be a complicated one. But this is not the case. For regulators 
from product market definition point of view it is not particularly important to judge whether 
bundles  can  be  effective  substitutes  of  a  single  broadband  service,  because  there  is  no 
potential or actual competition problem from the mere fact that they are on the same market 
now, except the case when the market is on the way to be split. In this extreme the problem 
would be that as a result the bundle will be a separate market. This hypothesis cannot be 
judged from the results. 
                                                 
6 We do not discuss the issue of different quality levels of the internet services; here we assume that they are 
linked through chain substitution.    9 
But the opposite question of whether any set of bundles constitute a separate market, if the 
tests  starts  with  a  defined  bundle,  is  more  relevant.  If  bundle  can  be  a  separate  relevant 
market, bundled offers can compete only with  bundled ones, and the presumably  smaller 
number of firms on the market increases the chance of finding one with market power, or 
there could be higher chance of some form of collusion between the players. In this case the 
regulator has to analyze both the single and the bundle markets separately. 
As the research paper on this issue of the Dutch regulator
7  rightly states, that the substitution 
can be asymmetric, i.e. working in one direction, but not in the other, starting from single 
offer we might find that the market contains bundles as well, but starting from a triple play 
bundle the SSNIP test may conclude that even the 2-play and single broadband offers together 
cannot be so effective substitutes to make the 10% price rise  unprofitable for the hypothetical 
monopolist of the triple play bundle. That is why the starting point is important. Therefore we 
define the main research question as the test of bundle as a separate market hypothesis. In the 
next section we discuss the methodological considerations and main elements of our research 
design. 
 
Methodology and research design 
 
The typical research method of investigating aggregate effects of individual consumer choices 
when no historical data is available is the stated preference method. This technique often also 
builds upon the consumer choice approach proposed by Lancaster that the demand is not for 
the good in itself but rather the many characteristics of the good which are providing utility to 
the consumer. This approach has the consequence of a more effective analysis of demand for 
goods that are closer or farther substitutes, but it can also be used as a base to construct a 
research setting in which demand and attitudes toward still non existent goods can be tested 
against  their  existing  counterparts.  A  research  technique,  conjoint  analysis  emerged  as  a 
method for testing attitudes toward a wide range of good characteristics with surveys. The 
method is based on the idea that if there are too many combinations to be tested, (if we have 
N products with M characteristics each, N
M potential products are possible), the number of 
options to test can be significantly reduced if some assumptions are made, making the test 
empirically feasible. For example the orthogonal design assumes that the main effects are 
independent. However, in this case lack of independence may lead biased results. 
A special variant of the stated preference method is the choice experiment
8. In this experiment 
participants are asked to choose from a limited set of products with variable characteristics. 
Prediction of the choice is calculated directly from the data without estimating individual 
utility  functions.  Statistical  methods  (for  example  multinomial  logit  model)  are  used  for 
estimating  the  effects  of  different  factors.  The  advantage  of  this  method  is  that  the 
respondents  face  less  complex  and  more  real  choice  situations.  The  flip  side  is  that  the 
modeling task is more challenging. 
Using choice experiment was an option at the beginning of our research study, because n-play 
bundles have different characteristics in each element’s quantity, quality and price dimension. 
Unfortunately  the  possible  choice  combinations  are  numerous  even  in  the  real  market 
situation. Research cost and feasibility constraints induced us to find such a solution which 
keeps the reliability of the results and do not put too heavy burden on respondents considering 
the time and complexity of the answers to the questionnaire. We know that respondents had 
made their choice and already chosen they most preferred option from the available set. It 
seems  logical that  in case of a 10% price  increase  induces them to really consider those 
                                                 
7 See OPTA (2007) 
8 Louviére and Timmermans (1990).   10 
options which are real substitutes to their current one. Truly artificial options may induce 
fuzzy answers and decrease the reliability of the results.  
 
The  combination  of  revealed  preference  and  stated  preference  methods
9  can  be  a  good 
solution to our problem. This approach can handle the choice had been made - and takes them 
as if they were optimal in the previous decision setting. In the hypothetical situation of the 
price increased by an amount which is exactly 10% of the price, one option of course is to 
keep with the status quo and pay the higher price. Dropping the service must and degrade it 
may also be in the available choice set. 
The problem with this approach is that the alternatives generated are not fully independent of 
the former choice and somehow restrict the choice set. Having kept our research goal in mind 
this bias was not a big concern, since not the estimation of the demand function was at stake 
but the test whether the respondents state that they were switching away or remain with their 
former choice as a reaction to the price change. However, another problem is the issue that a 
respondent typically overestimates his reactions: he says that he will take an action compared 
to his actual future behavior more often than the effect in the opposite direction: that he will 




When we are using surveys for supporting competition or regulatory decisions we can use the 
same methods as in commercial cases, but with some special focus because of the aim of the 
research is different. Our team tested some techniques in the past some years to adapt to and 
develop survey design elements  for regulatory purposes, identifying and measuring switching 
cost
10 and  consumer reactions to SSNIP like price changes on different markets
11. 
In this research our aim was to test consumers’ reactions to relative price changes in a real 
market setting, and their attitudes toward bundled offers. At the first sight it is evident that the 
choice  situation  is  different  according  to  the  consumption  situation  of  each  respondent, 
namely what type of service or package he is currently using. The first thing is to identify this 
situation  because  it  determines  the  choice  set  they  face  in  the  investigated  hypothetical 
situation. This was the starting point in the survey design. 
The key points were the followings: 
  Which dimensions are relevant for (consumer) respondent segmentation/grouping? 
  Which offers are considered relevant for each group? 
  What kind of changes shall be tested against the initial real situation? 
  What kind of motives have to be tested in each choice situation? 
 
The first bloc of the questionnaire identifies the characteristics of the status quo situation. The 
results  are  used  to  create  the  groups  with  different  situations.  Key  differentiating 
characteristics are:  
  What kind of services the respondent currently consumes? 
  Who is the provider or are the providers of service(es) and/or the bundle he subscribes 
to? 
  If he consumes more than one services, how many and which services are provided by 
the same seller? 
                                                 
9 See Meyer (2007). 
10 Lőrincz and Nagy (2010). 
11 Lőrincz and Nagy (2010); Édes, Bölcskei, Lőrincz, Nagy, Pápai (2010).   11 
  If he consumes more than one service which one of them is bought in the form of a 
bundle? 
 
These  answers  were  necessary  to  define  the  main  groups  having  different  service 
consumption and subscription profiles. Having used the answers we have created a three level 
ordering, on the basis of: 
  number of services consumed (0-3) 
  of which from the same provider (0-3) 
  of which are in a bundle (0-3)  
 
These subscription characteristics served as the main dimensions for grouping, though there 
was a need to use some more in the questionnaire. 
Beside these  characteristics, the first section of the questionnaire collected information about 
the main technical and technological and consuming  characteristics of the services they were 
subscribing:  fixed  telephony  (technology),  internet  (technology,  speed),  television 
(technology),  mobile  telephony  (number  of  subscriptions  in  the  household,  private  or 
company)  and  mobile (the  same as  in  mobile telephony).  We registered the name of the 
service providers. For each potential element of triple play package (fixed telephony, internet 
and pay television) we asked the monthly cost, for telephony we asked the subscription and 
usage fee. Though the preferred source of the price information was the monthly bill, smaller 
part of the respondents used that, mostly they reported their perception. For the later part of 
the questionnaire this “recalled” personal price information were considered and taken as real 
and were used for calculating later offers, and for calculation of direct amounts when we 
asked about 10 or 20  % price changes. 
The strong need for segmentation, and the need for personalized calculation of changes and 
generating offers applicable to the respondents’ real situations, led us to conclude, that we 
needed a survey supported by laptop. A little computing support behind saved us a lot, giving 
the opportunity to streamline the questionnaire and tailor to the types of respondents, and we 
could drop all time consuming questions for those for whom it was irrelevant. This choice 
was also useful for choosing from real market offers even if there were more than 30 service 
providers on the list with many offers. By using direct laptop supported questioning, we could 
target the questions according to the respondents identified choice situation and type. 
 
The second bloc was the main part of the questionnaire. Two types of questions we asked. 
First we tested consumer reactions to actual market situation, if they had been more informed 
than they were, showing them real market offers without changing the price. Then we asked 
their reaction if they had to face a hypothetical long term price change of their current type of 
service. We also asked that in another state of the world if they had got an offer which is 
cheaper with 10 or 20% then the current market price would have change their mind and 
switched to that bundle or individual service in question. We asked them about the reasons or 
attitudes behind their original choice and if it was relevant behind changing their mind.  
If  handling  of  many  subgroups  somewhat  differently  was  easily  manageable  with  laptop 
support, what sets the limit to this segmentation? Targeting questioning to the situation is 
good for getting more into the details but at a cost of decreasing respondent numbers, that is 
representativeness.  How  can  we  avoid sacrificing too  much  representativeness  for  getting 
more detailed knowledge? We tried to optimize by limiting the focus and standardizing the 
questions as much as possible. The advantage of this was the possibility to re-aggregate the 
responses, or to group respondents differently, so we could almost always have larger groups 
at the end. 
   12 
We posed relatively few types of questions, but asked them from many groups, tailored to 
their situation. Beside the main dimension, i.e. the number and type of services consumed, we 
used for segmentation the dimension of the respondent’s relation to subscribe to a bundle. So 
we differentiated according to whether he or she: 
  already had a bundle 
  could have got a bundle without switching (more than one services, but at the same 
provider) 
  could only have got a bundle with switching (subscribing to more than one services 
but different providers) 
  could have got a bundle by buying new element (subscribing to only one service) 
 
We combined the service dimensions with the bundle related dimensions getting 24 groups 
potentially. The logical skeleton of the questioning based on the above “relation to bundles” 
dimension was the following: 
Group: respondents with bundle: 
  Why did he/she choose the bundle? 
  How much he/she saves with the bundle? 
  What did he/she do if he/she could save 10% (the exact amount) leaving the bundle? 
  What did he/she do if the price of his current bundle increased by 10% (the exact 
amount)? 
Group: respondents, who could have a bundle with or without switching 
  Why did not he/she choose a bundle? 
  Would he/she subscribe to a bundle on the market which grants 10% discount to the 
sum of individual services? 
  If not, would do it with 20% discount? 
  If did not subscribe to triple play, would he/she choose a double? 
Group: respondents, who could only have a bundle with buying additional services 
  Would he/she subscribe to an additional service (on market price)? 
  Would he/she subscribe to an additional service bundled with his current one (on less 
than 10% than the sum of the prices of individual product)? 
 
We asked “why” questions in order to get information about the motives or rationalization of 
the choice. 
 “Market offers” were real or calculated on the basis of real offers in case of defining a bundle 
with 10%  less the price of the given pure element’s offer prices.  For those who did  not 
subscribe to a service, let’s say the internet we offered the basic version of that service on 
market price and 10% less of the total if it was offered in bundle. If someone did not take the 
10% bundle offer, we offered it for 20% less, in order to test whether the price is the issue or 
some other motive is working behind the refutation. If they declined this offer, we asked, 
why. 
Questions were also differentiated according to the dimension of the number of services used 
and from the same provider or not. We report the relevant responses in the result section.  The 
questionnaire  contained  many  other  questions  about  the  context  of  consuming  electronic 
communication  services,  and  the  usual  individual  and  household  socio-demographic 
variables. 
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Sample 
 
The  research  made  by  Infrapont  Ltd.  was  supported  by  a  grant  from  the  Hungarian 
Competition  Office.  The  population  was  the  18+  population  of  Hungary,  and  the  1000 
member of the sample were chosen by stratified sampling, and were representative by age, 
gender, and strata. The survey was conducted in April-May 2010 with laptop supported face-
to-face questionnaire by Ipsos Hungary.  
In order to correct sampling errors, a four dimensional individual weight was used based on 






First we show the technology divisions of telephone, internet and television subscriptions by 
technology. 
 
Table1. Service share by technology for telephony, internet and television 
telephone  N=1000  internet  N=1000  television  N=1000 
PSTN/ISDN  37,4%  Cable   20,5%  Cable  56,1% 
Cable  5,9%  ADSL  16,2% 
Analog  terrestrial  or 
free satellite 
19,0% 
VOIP  0,2%  Mobile internet  4,2%  Paid Satellite  15,4% 
    Micro, Wifi  2,3%  IPTV  3,5% 
    ISDN  0,5%  Digital terrestrial  4,0% 
    Other  2,8%  Other  2,0% 
No  56,5%  No  53,5%     
Total:  100%  Total:  100%  Total:  100% 
 
The data is in line with other market studies and shows the distinctive characteristic of the 
Hungarian market compared to EU mainstream or average
13, namely: 
  high penetration of cable as a television media, together with significant paid satellite, 
and the remaining more than one fifth share of those who are watching free analog or 
digital channels  only 
  cable is almost dominant share in broadband, 
  relatively low penetration of fixed telephony, and significant share of cable.  
 
                                                 
12 A very detailed report on the study is available on Hungarian as Infrapont (2010). 
13 To learn more about these distinctive features and their regulatory consequences see Banhidi and Papai (2010).   14 
Table2. Service combinations according to how many services someone is subscribing to 
Service combinations  N=1000 
Single service  27,7% 
television + internet  18,0% 
television + telephone  16,5% 
telephone + internet  1,8% 
telephone + internet + television  20,7% 
no subscription  15,3% 
Total:  100% 
 
 
Fifty-seven per cent of the households are subscribing more than one services and fifth of the 
population pays for telephone, internet and multichannel television together, though not all of 
them  consumes  these  services  in  bundle.  Therefore  it  is  important  to  prepare  a  well 
differentiated table to see the patterns whether subscriptions are at the same service provider 
or not and the share of those subscribing to the services separately or in a bundle. 
 
Figure6. Customer subgroups according to the subscribed services, same or different providers, and whether they 




It is interesting to see that among those who subscribed to at least two services, a little bit 
above 40% consuming all of them in bundle.  Though in the subgroup of subscribers to three 
services,  the  (2  or  3  elements)  bundle  share  is  73%,  but  the  proportion  of  real  3-play   15 
consumers  among  them  is  only  41  %.  The  overall  3-play  penetration  is  8,6%  and    any 
combination of 2-play penetration is 22,6% 
 
The most popular 2 service combination is television and internet, and this is the most widely 
used 2-play bundle too. The second 2 service combination with slightly less popularity is 
telephone  and  television  but  they  are  rather  consumed  separately.  Telephone  and  internet 
combination is much less significant than television and net combination and the same as 
television and phone. This shows not only the diminishing popularity of fixed telephony but 
the  effect  of  the  strong  presence  of  cable  television  networks on  bundle  availability  and 
matching the supply options with consumers’ preference. 
Figure7. Share of each bundle type in the total bundles in the sample 











Twenty-five per cent of the total bundles are 3-play. The relative popularity of different 2-
play bundles shows that internet is rather bundled with television and almost 2/3 less chance 
with telephony. 
 
An important input to our study was the price respondent’s household pays for the services. 
The reported monthly bill data which is seen on the next table is in line with the observed 
offers on the market.    16 
Table3. Household monthly spending on combinations of telephone, internet and paid television services   
  telephone  internet  television  net+tv  tel + tv  tel+net  3-play 
  258  164  495  143  49  41  93 
1-1999 HUF  8,7 %  2,8 %  9,6 %  1,1 %  1,2 %  0 %  0 % 
2000-3999 HUF  32,8 %  33,8 %  60,3 %  2,5 %  15,9 %  8,4 %  3,9 % 
4000-5999 HUF  40,2 %  44,5 %  24,8 %  19,2 %  40,9 %  15,1 %  3,8 % 
6000-7999 HUF  9,1 %  16,3 %  4,9 %  42,1 %  32,3 %  20,9 %  20 % 
8000- 9999 HUF  3,3 %  2,6 %  0,4 %  22,3 %  7,2 %  14,5 %  13,7 % 
10000-15000 HUF  4,9 %  0 %  0 %  12,3 %  0 %  31,9 %  46,2 % 
15000-20000 HUF  0,4 %  0 %  0 %  0,5 %  2,5 %  6,9 %  12,4 % 
20000 HUF or more  0,6 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  0 %  2,3 %  0 % 
average  2543  4507  3423  7265  5662  8726  10241 
standard deviation  1304  1547  1309  2244  2620  4740  3414 
Total  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 % 
Notes: Respondents’ estimates. Mode and average are highlighted. The nominal exchange rate was ~275 HUF = 
1EUR). The number of respondents is 852, but one person may have more than one separate subscriptions so the 
sum of subsrcriptions is higher. 
 
We used the individual payment data for calculating the 100 HUF rounded amount of 10% or 
20% price changes. 
 
Consumer’s reactions in different subgroups 
 
The next figures and tables show the reactions of respondents in different groups. Respondent 
expressed their stated preference toward hypothetical price changes and after that they had to 
give some reasoning concerning their former choice (revealed preference) and their current 
decision (change or not). 
 
For reading the figures correctly it is necessary to know that: 
  respondents always answered to closed questions 
  data in the table is always for the same subgroup and N is always constant in a column 
  arrows are not indicating causality, only the order of the questions 
  “market offer” is  a common offer on the market, something which is usually existent 
in the portfolio of main players (with average technical and quality terms)  
  “bundle offer” is always dependent on the context. It is a 2- or 3-play offer which is 
available to the customer, with or without switching provider, and priced with 10% 
discount to the sum of the price of the elements. This option  involves a one  year 
commitment, which is typical on the market. 
  20% discount “bundle offer” is the same as above except the price 
 
 First we present the results regarding single service consumers. 
   17 




11% of the households with television service only would accept a market offer with internet 
and but only 8,5%  would take it in bundle. Telephone only households seem to be absolutely 
uninterested in subscribing to internet. Television offer to households both with telephone or 
internet only is more popular, since a little bit more than 10% accept the market offer and 
almost all of them would buy it in bundle. 
 
Households can have two subscriptions in different ways: services can be bundled or at the 
same provider but not bundled or even subscriptions with different providers. Those with 
bundle were tested against relative bundle price rise.  If cheaper separate options arise, it 
rather induces only looking for a cheaper bundle, not to reject bundled offers. Customers 
rather search another bundle. However there is some asymmetry in reactions: if there are 
cheaper non-bundled alternatives (i.e. opportunity to gain with leaving the bundle) it does not 
induce switching, but direct bundle price rise (i.e. loss) would induce breaking up the bundle, 
or discard one of the services for few customers.  
Among those with separate subscriptions around 20% would welcome the same services in 
bundle with normal 10% discount, and a further 4% the -20% offer.  Those getting the two 
services from the same provider are more receptive of such an offer. Interesting is that the 2/3 
who rejects an economically very attractive option. This phenomenon suggests some bundle 
aversion. (Figure9.) 
   18 
Figure9. Reactions to a bundle offer with 10% and 20% discount and to a 10% relative price increase of a 
bundle; Group: households subscribing to 2 services either in a bundle or without it  
 
 
Those who have a 3-play  bundle are even  more  loyal to bundles than those with 2-play.  
Switching  to other  cheaper  bundle  is  their  firs  answer  to the  relative  price  rise.  Cheaper 
unbundled opportunity on the choice horizon here also induces fewer customers searching 
some cheaper bundle alternative, than the perceived loss because of the 10%price rise. In case 
of price rise 7% would break up the bundle. (Figure10.) 
   19 




There were only a few respondents in the sample who were subscribing 3 services at the same 
provider, but in the form of a 2-play and a single. They answered almost exactly the same way 
as the 3-play customers   to the relative price changes.  They also insist keeping the bundle. In 
case they got a normal bundle offer, 35% would take it. With 20% discount it adds up to 48%.  
It suggests that they are very receptive toward 3-play bundles. What is against the intuition is 
the dismissive attitude of those who do not want to have everything bundled from the same 
provider. (Figure10.)  
 
As we see on Figure11 this bundle rejection is weaker in the group where there is a 2-play 
bundle and the third service is bought from another provider. At least with some conditions 
more than would 40% accept a normal 3-play bundle, which rises to almost a 75% if the 
discount were 20%. The loyalty of this group to bundle is similar to other bundle customers.  
Price changes induce searching for a cheaper bundle and break up is rather the exception or 
last resort.   20 
Figure11. Reactions to a bundle offer with 10% and 20% discount; Group: households subscribing to 3 sparate 
services or a 2-play bundle at the same service provider 
 
 
A subgroup in the Figure11 above with three separate subscriptions at the same provider, 
react positively to a normal bundle offer, would 35% take it. What is interesting, a more 
radical discount does not induce them better switching to a bundle. The aversion or hesitancy 
of the rejecting 65% seems to be strong, and cannot be compensated even by 20% discount to 
the current price. It may be the case that the current choice of those who reject the offer 
reveals their mere reluctance toward bundling. 
   21 




Another group having two subscriptions at the same provider behaves a little bit differently 
than those with three separate subscriptions at the same provider.  Around 30% accepts the 2-
play  bundle  with  at  most  20%  discount,  which  is  rather  similar  to those  with  3  separate 
subscriptions. But they are more open to the offered 3-play bundle. One third of them would 
switch to 3-play at least with some conditions with 10% discount which goes up to 45% for a 
20% discount. They seem to be a little more receptive to a 3-play bundle. However the 55 % 
rejection together with other group’s similar rejection rates suggests that choosing a bundle is 
not just a question of price. 
These anomalies from economic point of view require looking behind the decisions or stated 
preferences. We discuss these issues in the next section. 
 
Customers’ attitudes toward bundles 
 
As  we  indicated  in  the  research  design  section,  we  wanted  to  know the  attitudes  behind 
decisions and asked for some subjective reasoning of the revealed and stated choices of the 
respondents. 
For reading the figures correctly it is necessary to know that: 
  respondents always answered to closed questions 
  in some cases they answered more than one options   22 
  data in the table is always for the same subgroup and N is always constant in a column 
  arrows are not indicating causality, only the order of the questions 
 
We  asked  those  with  one  single  service  whether  they  bought  a  2-play  bundle  with  10% 
discount. From those 9% (25 respondents) asked why had not they done this before. The 
answer revealed lack of information, and false preconceptions of lack of such offers. If these 
reasons simply reflect information problems, it can be handled by more effective marketing. 
Major  reason  of  rejection  was  that  there  is  no  demand  for  an  additional  service  neither 
bundled nor separately. Second reason was price. The other two reflect that some respondents 
really disliked commitment and/or bundles. 
 
We asked the bundle subscriber population why they had chosen the bundle (only one answer 
was possible). The main reason of choosing a bundle was that the services are cheaper, as we 
expected. One bill is also an important factor. Some reasoned his choice with one bill and 
easier administration. Perceived savings with the bundle are significant if we compare it with 
the perceived prices reported in Table3.  
 
Figure12 also shows the aggregate reaction of bundle subscribers to a relative price increase, 
and we find that even some respondents would react, but they prefer buying some cheaper 
bundle. The attitude is similar in the case of a direct 10% price increase, but the group of 
those who react by rather searching an alternative bundle is doubled. Breaking up the bundle 
or even discarding one of the services is considered by a tiny minority. 
 
Figure12. Reactions to 10% relative price increase; Group: households subscribing to any bundle 
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Attitudes  of  those  who  were  using  more  than  one  service  but  not  in  a  bundle  seem 
characteristically different.  Those who buy services from the same provider firmly reasoned 
by stating preference for having separate subscriptions (35%) and aversion to commitment 
(26%). Lack of information or matching with needs problem and administration difficulties 
are minor factors. On the basis if this attitudes it is not surprising that only a third of this 
group would accept a bundle, and 2/3 rejected even a 20% discount bundle offer. Bundle 
resistance as shown in Figure13 seems strong.  
 
Figure13.  Reactions  to  a  bundle  offer  with  10%  and  20%  discount;  Group:  subscribing  to  more  than  one 




The  group  of  those  having  more  than  one  subscription  but  at  different  providers  reacts 
similarly but their distaste for commitment or mere preference against bundle is weaker. They 
rather refer to lack of information or problem with matching the bundled offers to their needs. 
In this group loyalty to providers was also mentioned. This group is a little bit more receptive 
to bundle but not unconditionally because having some preference for a particular provider. 
Many of them prefer one of the providers to others.  However after a 20% discount still 
almost 60% rejected subscribing to a bundle, as can be seen on Figure 14. 
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Figure14. Reactions to a bundle offer with 10% and 20% discount; Group: subscribing to more than one services 
but different service providers 
 
 
We  asked  other  questions  about the  experiences  and  evaluations.    These  well  reflect  the 
information showed above. Bundle buyers like bundle and mostly satisfied with that. They 
have  less  aversion  to  commitment,  strictly  prefer  receiving  a  single  bill,  less  afraid  of 
administrative problems,  are loyal, but do not afraid of switching even with a bundle. 
Bundle users clearly attribute the cheaper, simpler, easier for one word better qualities to 
bundle compared the combination of separate services. Their preference is reinforced by their 
experience. 
Though all elements are important, bundle users consider first the television, and then internet 
as the most critical element of a bundle as it is shown in Table4.  Lower importance of fixed 
telephony is evident from the answers. 
 
Table4. What is the critical element of a bundle? 
Subscribed to or would subscribe to a bundle 
N=422 










It is important that the telephone in the bundle satisfy 
my needs   39.2  34.4  16.7  9.7  3.0 
It is important that the internet in the bundle satisfy 
my needs  49.9  30.6  6.4  13  3.2 
It is important that the television in the bundle satisfy 
my needs  60.4  34.4  3.6  1.6  3.5 
 
Preference of those who rejected buying bundle is based on lack of information and beliefs 
they hold about against the advantages of bundles.  They don’t want to change because they   25 
are satisfied with their position.  Majority of them reports that they have not devoted enough 
time to search for a better deal.  
 
 
Is bundle the relevant market? 
 
After the detailed report of the results, we must return to the original question: what is the 
relevant market.  
If we consider those consumers’ reaction who are currently subscribed  more than one to 
separate services and faced a bundle offer on the market even without an increase of price of 
any of his consumed services, enough of them would switch to a bundle. From this respect 
bundle is evidently a substitute for many, even if some “single” buyers are holding some 
aversion toward bundles.  
More important is the question of what the case is from the point of a bundle. Simply minded 
economic approach said that a bundle price increase certainly instinct breaking up the bundle, 
and picking the services separately, if the difference  between the aggregate price of available 
separate options and the new bundle price becomes positive. However this approach forgets 
that bundle customers clearly attribute some special value to having a bundle. The value of a 
bundle  is  more than the  mere aggregate of the utilities  from service elements. Responses 
clearly indicate that if you have bundle, a moderate relative price increase dos not bother you 
very much or rather induce you to find a cheaper one, and not breaking up the bundle. But 
what happens if there is no other cheaper bundle? 
The answer is not clear. We checked whether the customer had answered that he had been 
searching for a bundle alternative but he had the cheapest available bundle. In case of this he 
could decide to keep the bundle or leave it. From market definition point of view only the 
second option counts. A conservative approach rather considers the second options even if the 
bias that it may exaggerate the expected reactions. 
 
For the evaluation of the bundle as a separate relevant market hypothesis, we chose to use a 
simplified critical loss test. We intentionally chose not to use some elasticity estimate directly, 
but only corrected reported intentions of switching.    
 
Critical loss test uses the SSNIP test logic, to test that whether a hypothetical monopolist of 
the product increase the price and this small but significant non-transitory increase in price 
resulted in profit loss. If the outcome is loss in profit, than it is not a separate market, because 
consumer reactions made the price increase unprofitable, therefore the market do not worth to 
be monopolized. 
It  is  easy  to  understand  the  critical  loss  approach  if  we  understand  the  forces  effect  the 
profitability. 
A price increase induces customers to buy less from the good in question, which decreases the 
quantity sold. The supplier sell less for higher price, and also produce less, so it saves the 
variable cost of units he did not produce. The profit is affected by this aggregate effect. If the 
sum of the cost saved and the added difference between post increased revenue minus original 
revenue is positive, the price increase is profitable and it is a separate relevant market.  If the 
result is negative, the relevant market must be bigger. 
 
The critical loss test investigates whether the loss of sales is above a critical level when the 
variable cost savings and the larger price cannot balance the effect of diminishing quantity. 
 










α is the price increase (in decimal fraction),  
 εs is the own-price elasticity of the product,  
L is the Lerner index (the proportion of  fixed cost in the price) 
the critical loss equals αεs  above which the predefined α price increase results in profit 
loss 
 
The minimum of the critical loss for 10% price increase is 10/11=0.91. This happens in the 
case where there are no variable costs. If the variable cost is 10% of the total, the critical loss 
for 10% increase is exactly 10%.  The figure shows the critical loss as a function of portion of 
fixed cost in the price.  
 
Figure15. Critical loss as a function of the Lerner index 
Critical Loss threshold as a function of fixed cost 







0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
 
 
Our findings concerning switching away from the bundle were the followings:   27 
Table5. Expected loss as a reaction to 10% increase in price of the bundle 
 
  TV+net  TV+phone  phone+net  3-play  All bundles 
Do not switch  69.6%  73.6%  72.3%  59.6%  68.0% 
Search  for  a 
cheaper bundle  24.9%  16.2%  18.7%  31.8%  24.5% 
Break  up  the 
bundle  4.8%  3.3%  3.9%  7.4%  5.1% 
Break  up  and 
discard one of the 
services  0.7%  6.9%  5.2%  1.1%  2.4% 
  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
Our results show that between 5.5% and 10.2% of the customers broke up the bundle and 
some of them even discard one of the services in case of a 10% price increase. Televison and 
internet bundle seems to be the most and television and phone package is the least stable 
package.  3-play with its 8.5% switching is between. 2-play bundles seem less stable than 3-
play except the television and internet bundle. 
Since 9.1% is the minimum of the critical loss, and it applies only if every costs are fixed, our 
stated preference study suggest that intention to switch is below the 10% or higher critical loss 
threshold which should really be considered. Of course our result is rather indicative and not 
very robust, since we had to test its degree of confidence. However the conservative approach 
in handling the customers’ reactions may support our confidence, but it is not quantified. 
Regulators  need  to  build  their  decisions  on  more  robust  estimates.  Our  research  was 
constrained very much by time and budget, but the cost of a well prepared empirical study 




We showed the results of a study wanted to be a forerunner of testing the bundle is a separate 
market hypothesis. In the frame of our time and budget constrain we could show that it is 
possible to use empirical research to test such a market hypothesis in the field of electronic 
communication services. Bundles  are attractive  and clearly gaining ground on the current 
telecom market. Regulators have to be well prepared to address the challenges that bundles 
pose from competition point of view.  
Our study shows that bundles and especially 3-play bundles are indeed or are close to be 
separate markets. If 3-play is a separate retail market, it has to be handled accordingly.  
The separate bundle market hypothesis is supported by other information beside quantified 
reactions.  Results indicate that the direction of substitution is inside the world of bundles 
itself. A chain of substitution links bundles together since buying the services separately as 
before is not preferred by those who are happy with bundles.   
Bundle as a value in itself it is more then just the sum of its parts with the discount it is sold 
at. Using services in bundles with their other features generate more satisfaction than the 
services alone. At least this is the view of bundle users.  They are happy to be in, because 
their reported choice experience reinforces their initial preference. Those without bundle see   28 
the world differently. They consider bundle characteristics less attractive or even deterrent, 
but in many cases lack of information is behind their attitude. 
Bundle world is still surely connected to the world of separate services. There is no wall 
between them, but it does not mean that the traffic is the same in both directions. Our study 
suggests that it is easier and less painful, or even attractive to get into the bundle world but it 
is harder to relinquish it. 
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